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This Festchrift presents many different pieces of excellent philosophical 
work for further study and discussion. So, take a real experiment—take this 
book and read whatever interests you and fi nd out Miščević’s answers to 
articles particularly mentioned here and, as well, for all the others. We can 
praise editors for their immense work done.
DAVOR PEĆNJAK
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self¸ Rijeka: Fac-
ulty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2017, 375 pp.
The collection Perspectives on the Self brings together seventeen essays 
which explore the notion of the Self. Employing both historical and con-
ceptual analyses of the Self, the authors cover a variety of topics from re-
search areas that include metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
science, philosophy of language, ethics and history of philosophy. The book, 
published by the University of Rijeka, is a result of a conference, The Self, 
which took place at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka 
(Croatia) on March 31 and April 1, 2016. As noted in the preface by the edi-
tor Boran Berčić, Full Professor at the Rijeka Department of Philosophy, 
the participants of the conference, whose essays make up the volume, are 
in different ways involved in the research project Identity at the University 
of Rijeka. Those include both Croatian and foreign philosophers along with 
the reviewers of the book, Nenad Smokrović and Dušan Dožudić.
The book is divided into six chapters. The fi rst chapter, titled “Self and 
Body”, starts with “The Central Dogma of Transhumanism” by Eric T. Ol-
son (University of Sheffi eld). Olson argues against the transhumanist claim 
that it is metaphysically possible to upload our psychological selves into 
a digital computer. He identifi es the transhumanist claim as resting on 
a metaphysical assumption that we are essentially patterns (the pattern 
view) which can be transmitted as information. He then confronts the claim 
by insisting that we are essentially material things (more specifi cally—bio-
logical organisms), not patterns, and as such cannot be “detached” from our 
biological substrate and transferred into a computer. He also considers the 
so-called constitutional view and the temporal parts view but concludes that 
they cannot serve the transhumanist’s purposes.
Miljana Milojević (University of Belgrade) in “Embodied and Extended 
Self” combines a functionalist ontology of the self with an embodied and 
extended view on the mind. She starts by accepting the psychological-con-
tinuity criterion of personal identity (Parfi t). She then casts it in a realiz-
er-functionalist ontology which, Milojević believes, allows for an embodied 
view on the mind for which she fi nds justifi cation in the works of Gallagher, 
Shapiro and others. Finally, she uses multiple realizability of the mental to 
extend the self beyond the boundaries of the organism.
Zdenka Brzović (University of Rijeka) in “The Immunological Self” sur-
veys a number of possible identity criteria for a biological organism (func-
tional integration, autonomy, genetics). After showing their fl aws, Brzović 
shifts her analysis to different versions of the immunology criterion. She 
discusses the self-nonself theory (Burnet), several versions of the systematic 
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theories of immunity—the self as an autopoetic entity (Maturana and Va-
rela, Jerne), the danger theory (Matzinger) and the continuity theory (Pra-
deu)—but concludes that all of them share a problem of presupposing the 
identity of the organism, and thus cannot serve as the criterion of identity. 
The second chapter of the book, titled “Self-Knowledge” starts with 
“The Value of Self-Knowledge” by Nenad Miščević (University of Maribor). 
Miščević starts by drawing a distinction between two kinds of self-knowl-
edge—knowledge of one’s inner phenomenal states (such as knowing that 
my back is in pain) and knowledge of one’s causal and dispositional proper-
ties (knowing that I am easily frustrated or impatient). Miščević then turns 
to the question of their intrinsic and instrumental value. He argues against 
the claim that our knowledge of our phenomenal states has no instrumental 
value (Cassam). In addition, he insists that it also has an enormous intrin-
sic value for our conception of the self. Also, following Lehrer, he defends 
the instrumental value of knowledge of one’s causal and dispositional prop-
erties as a prerequisite for a wise life.
In “The Self-ascription of Conscious Experiences” Luca Malatesti (Uni-
versity of Rijeka) wonders how do we make the step from experiencing X 
(Malatesti uses color perception) to knowing (consciously) that we are expe-
riencing X. He analyses two models of self-awareness (Armostrong’s quasi-
perceptual model and Moore’s transparency of experience) but fi nds them 
both unsatisfactory. He concludes by offering a conception of the self which 
he believes to be a prerequisite for the possibility of conscious self-ascription 
of experiences. Here he follows Millar and claims that the concept of the self 
“involves the capacity to think about ourselves as entities that have sense 
organs and internal states that are determined by interactions with certain 
sorts of stimulation of these sense organs” (135).
The third chapter, “Self in the History of Philosophy” starts with “The 
Logical Positivists on the Self” by Boran Berčić (University of Rijeka). After 
analysing the logical positivists’ (Shlick, Ayer, Carnap, Weinberg, Reichen-
bach) critique of the Cartesian Cogito, Berčić shifts our attention to various 
ways in which the positivists understood the self. He draws a distinction 
between conceptual, epistemological and ontological reductionism about 
the self and concludes that, although the positivists were reductionist in 
all three senses, their reductionism should be understood primarily in its 
epistemological sense, meaning that we come to know about the self only a 
posteriori, that is, when we know what its elements are.
Ljudevit Hanžek (University of Split) in “Brentano on Self Conscious-
ness” examines a theory of self-consciousness by Franz Brentano, as put for-
ward by Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Stand-point (1874). 
In order to avoid an infi nite regress of mental states, Brentano argued that 
in addition to being aware of an object, mental states possess a certain kind 
of self-awareness. While analysing arguments pro et contra Brentano’s 
views, Hanžek considers a number of similar proposals—Uriah Kriegel’s 
theory which rests on the distinction between focal and peripheral aware-
ness; transitive and intransitive awareness (Kriegel, Gennaro, Rosenthal) 
and Amie Thomasson’s adverbial theory—but fi nds them all unsatisfactory.
Goran Kardaš (University of Zagreb) in the “No-Self View in Buddhist 
Philosophy” analyses the Buddhist claim that there exists no such thing 
as the self. Buddha believed that the self is an illusion rooted in bad cog-
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nitive mechanisms and linguistic practices. Kardaš surveys a number of 
arguments made by Buddha and his followers which were directed against 
earlier Indian metaphysicians who held a substantivist position on the self. 
In doing so, Kardaš reveals the empiricism, reductionism and eliminativism 
which is present in the Buddhist view of the self.
In “The Self in Ancient Philosophy” Ana Gavran Miloš (University of Ri-
jeka) argues against the claim that ancient Greeks didn’t possess the idea of 
subjectivity (Gill). She draws on the texts by Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus 
and concludes that, although the Ancients didn’t possess the modern, Car-
tesian conception of the self—understood “in terms of epistemic certainty 
and primacy of the pure subjective self-consciousness” (212)—their onto-
logical and (especially) ethical deliberations presuppose a subjective, fi rst-
personal point of view and a subjectivity/objectivity distinction.
The fi rst essay in the fourth chapter, titled “Self as Agent” is “Ideal Self 
in Non-Ideal Circumstances” by Matej Sušnik (University of Rijeka). As an 
internalist about the (normative) reasons of one’s actions, Sušnik analyses 
three suggested answers on the question about the relation between the 
real and the ideal self. He rejects the fi rst two (the straight-forward model 
and the advice model) and accepts the third, according to which an agent 
has a reason to do x only if there exists a “sound deliberative route” from the 
agent’s actual motives to his doing x (Williams).
Filip Čeč (University of Rijeka) in “The Disappearing Agent” analyses 
the disappearing agent objection (Pereboom) which is directed against the 
event causal version of the libertarian position about free will. According 
to the objection, the event-causal ontological framework (based on events 
and states) doesn’t secure the agent’s role in the decision-making process, 
especially in the so-called torn decisions which fi gure prominently in several 
event-causal accounts (Kane, Balaguer, Franklin). Torn decisions involve 
indeterminism in the decision-making process which seems to undermine 
the agents role in it. Čeč analyses fi ve possible ways in which an event 
causal libertarian might respond. He concludes by choosing the last option 
which claims that the event-causal libertarian can secure the agents role 
in spite of there being some indeterminacy in the decision-making process. 
Marko Jurjako (University of Rijeka) in “Agency and Reductionism 
about the Self” starts with an analysis of the psychological-continuity cri-
terion of personal identity developed by Parfi t (Parfi t 1984, 1995). He then 
presents some of the problems which seem to follow from the reductionism 
entailed by Parfi t’s account, especially those related to our moral and pru-
dential concerns. Both of these seem to presuppose a “deep unity” underly-
ing our personal identity and that unity is what Parfi t’s account seems to 
eliminate. Jurjako fi nds the agency based accounts of the self (Korsgaard, 
Bratman) capable of meeting these problems. He believes them to be com-
patible with the reductionist view and argues that their focus on our ability 
to act and deliberate as the source of personal identity provides the unity 
needed to vindicate our practical concerns.
The fi fth chapter, titled “The Non-existent Self” starts with “On nev-
er Been Born” by Marin Biondić (University of Rijeka). Biondić wonders 
whether we can make meaningful judgements about people who were never 
born. For example, can we feel sorry about those who were never born? 
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Biondić follows Parfi t and concludes that we can not. Here he relies on the 
view (also by Parfi t) that we can evaluate (in terms of good or bad) only lives 
of actual people.
Iris Vidmar (University of Rijeka) in “Fictional Characters” takes the 
“literary aesthetics” approach to the nature of fi ctional characters which 
focuses on “the way fi ctional characters come to life within established lit-
erary practices”. Within it, Vidmar discusses the ways fi ctional characters 
are brought into existence and what makes up their identity. As the main 
protagonist of her analysis, Vidmar takes Flaubert’s Emma Bovary. She 
concludes that the identity of fi ctional characters is multilayered and rela-
tional in nature and discusses some of the objections to her view.
The sixth and fi nal chapter, titled “Metaphysics and Philosophy of 
Language” starts with “Haecceity Today and with Duns Scotus” by Márta 
Újvári (Corvinus University of Budapest). She discusses the historical and 
contemporary understanding of haecceity. Traditionally, haecceity was un-
derstood as an entity, while contemporary authors see it as a “relational 
property of being identical with itself” (332). Relying on Chisholm and Sco-
tus, Újvári analyses several contemporary views (Rosenkratz, Diekemper, 
Gracia) which offer an account for the notion of haecceity but fi nds them all 
unsatisfying.
Arto Mutanen (Finnish National Defence University) in “Who Am I?” 
gives an analysis of the same question. He fi nds it to be a cluster-question 
with two possible answers. One is about identifi cation, the other about iden-
tity. He then expands on the distinction between identifi cation and identity, 
which he analyses by relying on Gleason, Hintikka, Quine and Kripke. He 
fi nds identifi cation to be a methodological notion concerned with determin-
ing who somebody is or what their location in society is (Gleason). On the 
other hand, identity is an ontological notion concerned with determining 
what kind of entity one is. Mutanen fi nds Descartes’ dualism to be the 
prime example of an answer to an identity question.
The last essay in the collection is “Meta-Representational Me” by Ta-
kashi Yagisawa (California State University). He starts by differentiating 
between the notion of me (which applies absolutely) from the notion of the 
self (which he believes to be relative). He then proceeds in developing an 
account of the notion of me. In doing so, he analyses the standard indexical 
theory, but fi nds it incomplete and offers his own theory which relies on the 
“way-to-thing shift” strategy. The theory claims that we represent the world 
in a certain fi rst-person way (Yagisawa calls it me-way). The me-way of 
representing enables me to pick myself as the recipient of that representa-
tion. Only then, Yagisawa believes, I come to postulate myself as an entity, 
as me.
Each of the seventeen essays found in the collection Perspectives on the 
Self makes a valuable contribution to contemporary explorations and dis-
cussions about the notion of the Self. Particularly signifi cant is the fact that 
the collection brought together a team of international authors, alongside 
with philosophers working in Croatia. Coming from different areas of philo-
sophical interest, the authors surveyed and analysed a variety of contempo-
rary and historical arguments, theories, traditions and problems related to 
the notion of the self. In doing so, they covered a wide range of topics related 
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to the self, such as identity, agency and mind. This volume will primarily 
be of interest to professional philosophers, psychologists, graduate students 
in philosophy, and other scientists interested in the philosophical themes 
related to the self, but with the help of a detailed and admirably clear intro-
duction by the editor, it can perhaps even be accessible to the general, intel-
lectually curious, public. We can conclude that the Perspectives on the Self 
is a successful exercise in contemporary analytic philosophy which brings 
valuable insights into areas of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and histo-
ry of philosophy, and is a major contribution to the philosophical literature 
published in Croatia.
MARKO DELIĆ
University of Split, Split, Croatia
